Social Dimensions and Social Function Born in Latin America:  Property Limits in the U.S. and the European Union Legal Systems by Migliari, Wellington
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy 
Volume 2 
Issue 1 Study Space X Marseille, France Article 6 
2017 
Social Dimensions and Social Function Born in Latin America: 
Property Limits in the U.S. and the European Union Legal Systems 
Wellington Migliari 
University of Barcelona, wemigliari@yahoo.com.br 
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Land Use Law 
Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Migliari, Wellington (2017) "Social Dimensions and Social Function Born in Latin America: Property Limits 
in the U.S. and the European Union Legal Systems," Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy: Vol. 2 : 
Iss. 1 , Article 6, 78-100. 
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol2/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please 
contact mbutler@gsu.edu. 
 SOCIAL DIMENSIONS AND SOCIAL FUNCTION BORN IN LATIN 
AMERICA:  PROPERTY LIMITS IN THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN 






This article is a comparative analysis of property systems and their social 
dimensions between the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU). 
Throughout the article, we show how the fees and development taxes applied 
in the U.S. refer to an ex ante rationale assumed by private owners to 
compensate communities for land transformation or environmental impacts, 
while inside the EU, the political consensus is responsible for the imposition 
of limits in ex post abuses of ownership. Either in public administrations, or in 
the Council of Ministers of the EU, the social function of property is better 
understood as a sensitive matter of national governments that may affect the 
harmony of the organisation (Trstenjak, 2017). First, we point out the 
importance of the social function of property in historical terms with the 
intellectual debate introduced by Léon Duguit on the internal limits of 
ownership. Second, we apply an interpretative methodology to distinguish the 
meaning, use and totality of law from experience (Ferrajoli, 2008). Third, 
leading U.S. and EU case laws about disputes involving impact fees, 
development taxes and the juridical category of social dimension are 
discussed. Our study concludes that the U.S. legal system is mostly linked to 
the notion of fees and taxes to tackle abuses in urban development against the 
environment. The American federalist pact provides public administrations, 
local, and state courts with robust discretionary power. In contrast, we 
observed that the EU tends to be more anarchical in mechanisms of 
enforcement when compared to its institutional legal organisms with 
supranational binding decisions (Muir, 2015; Wendt, 1992). 
 
KEY WORDS: social function of property, impact fees, development taxes, 




1. SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY BEYOND THE PRIVATE LAW 
METAPHYSICS 
The seminal text on the social function of property as a juridical 
category was originally delivered at a conference by Léon Duguit in Buenos 
Aires in 1911. The first of several ideas introduced in the work has to do with 
a political and historical context unfolding a reflection on the abuses of the 
system of property from the Ancien Régime to a more complex social 
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 experience led by the bourgeoisie. Duguit points out how eminent is the place 
for civilizations after the French Revolution (1789) and the Napoleonic Civil 
Code (1804). Next, he presents himself as a lecturer guided by his scientist 
perspective, without any political, religious or dogmatic belief, to examine 
private law. The French professor admits his thoughts were addressed to an 
audience of experts and should be restricted to the academic realm once he 
was not inciting minds to transform his words in a vulgar propaganda. The 
context in which the attendees took place during the political celebration of 
the first anniversary of Argentinian independence. A moment yet susceptible 
to revolution, as the one which occurred in 1905 when the provinces rebelled 
against the central power in Buenos Aires. Léon Duguit was an eloquent 
defender of a legal thinking centered on social experience, which contrasted 
with the pure philosophy in law vindicated by a positivist tradition (Duguit, 
1987, pp. 19-21). He used to criticise the modus operandi of private law in the 
fields of metaphysics, because most of all conceptual and intellectual 
dogmatism for him was usually challenged by reality. The category of 
property may remain stable in Duguit’s writings while he used to see the 
ownership as a real object vulnerable to the social contingency and liberal 
conceptions (Pasquale, 2015; Rodotà, 1986). 
By contingency, the French intellectual understood the irreparable 
fissure between the task of the legislator in making laws or codes and the 
challenging reality. Whether we classify a legal system as progressive or 
conservative, the reality built by individuals does not have the same time, pace 
and desires of political representatives. However, for Léon Duguit, the 
strength of the people make up the core of a deictic law, which establishes a 
strong connection to history and moment, since human demands are the real, 
giant impulses for new juridical institutions. Beyond a supposed and infecund 
interpretation of what may be law, he questions the historical authority to set 
the limits for life, freedom, and property of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen which reveals its inner retrograde face in the 1804 
Napoleonic Code. Property became central in that debate about contingency, 
because ownership started being the cruel parameter for the other principles 
idealised by the French Revolution. In other words, we translate the 
metaphysical boundaries of the Republican joy on liberté, égalité and 
fraternité by the liberty or absolute power of property over the rest of human 
values. Proprietors were the owners of the contingency, i.e., they possessed by 
force and violence supported by the Napoleonic Empire the prerogative to set 
their own rights (Duguit, 1987, pp. 22-23).  
The first half of the 19th century proved that men did not accept that 
establishment. Popular political organisations crystallised in the Paris 
Commune proved a radical view on what might be the change of time, or the 
revolution of an established contingent order. The French post-revolutionary 
private law that had been created for the benefit of the few was the first legal 
trench the unsatisfied wanted to modify. Léon Duguit defends his point of 
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 view, presenting two questions to be observed. First, the 1789 Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen and the 1804 Napoleonic Code relies on the 
notion of individuals living free of conflicts in their surroundings. It is a 
disguised tautology. Second, the two normative frameworks forged in France 
left the false impression that the wishes of individuals and groups would 
supplant the social dimension present in all rights. So, for the French jurist, the 
documents of 1789 and 1804 created metaphysical or abstract meanings of 
private law, not to corroborate the needs of the majority, but to differentiate a 
minority of proprietors from the rest of the dispossessed (Duguit, 1987, pp. 
24-25). The Empire of Napoleon III, the Paris Commune, and the Franco-
Prussian War attested to how the lack of a cohesive social function in law in 
France fragmented, inflicted and humiliated the French for almost a century 
since 1789. As some historians affirm, the internal tension between the greedy 
affluent elites and the working class debilitated the French State because 
France was not unified on domestic issues leaving internal disputes to favour 
other nations. This allowed for the emergence of new political powers in 
Europe, as is shown by the strengthening of the German and Russian Empire 
(Wells, 2006).  
 
2. INTERPRETATIVE BOUNDARIES 
Rights are usually taken for granted as an unrestricted powerful 
conquest for individuals in democratic societies. However, the combination of 
legal entitlements with other powers, such as economic ones, can result in the 
need to create common ground in the international order (Griffiths, 1992). In 
that sense, proprietors are usually the ones who fight for the definition of what 
a right is, through their representatives, regardless of territorial matters. Under 
the flag of individual freedom, they are expected to be entitled to all autonomy 
to express their desires related to the object that belongs to them. According to 
M. R. Cohen, it is a relation that may occur in absoluteness and negative forms 
if considered a matter out of any public control:  
Hence the theory of the natural rights of the individual took not 
only an absolute but a negative form; men have inalienable 
rights, the state must never interfere with private property, etc. 
The state, however, must interfere in order that individual 
rights should become effective and not degenerate into public 
nuisances.  
(Cohen, 1927, p. 21). More recent reflections of constitutional or foundational 
rights of a society have been proposed by two famous jurists. Ronald Dworkin 
defends the notion that any exercised right should be subject to limitation. 
Dworkin asks whether justice or liberty is free from any limit. This is the core 
question for fundamental rights in the age of abuse (Dworkin, 2011). The right 
to property has not been different. An Italian jurist called Luigi Ferrajoli also 
pointed out how slippery the semantics of constitutions may be, since charters 
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 are impregnated with values and principles that are not necessarily born in 
social experience (Ferrajoli, 2008). Although both authors belong to different 
schools and traditions in law, they have important values in common. 
However, when we delve into the view Ferrajoli uses to suggest a 
theory in law, the syntax is put aside by the author since syntactical analyses 
are prone to the calculus of how words operate for language interpreters. 
Justices, public defenders, and lawyers tend to be technical translators of law 
and, consequently,  the debate of legal content is transformed into a grammar 
debate. Therefore, besides any legal postulation relying much more on 
grammar, there are meta-theories in relation to the positive law which is 
eventually in charge of the discourse. Ferrajoli refers to the meanings 
(semantics) of real finalities and the explanation of law as a meta-theory 
reduced to the formality of the written norms evidently susceptible to action of 
time, social class and domination. The notions of sovereignty, property and 
government are very illustrative when they are captured by economic forces 
(Habermas, 2011). Second, the Italian jurist suggests the relevance of the 
pragmatic views (pragmatics) when law is in use showing theories of law 
most of the time manipulate linguistic codes to justify what is legal. As a third 
meta-theory, the level of syntax is the most complex one since it is the ground 
where the syntactic relationships of signs occur. We see the realm of symbols 
and signs as the place where the law trespasses the limits of language, 
touching the human experience and showing at the same time the 
contradictions of the social function. To better understand the theoretical 
debate of Ferrajoli, we intend to show how social dimensions of the right to 
property may be strictly pragmatic in cities where law tends to be very 
restrictive in interpreting environmental impacts. In the U.S. cases, ownership 
is not always an absolute right even when a legal act seems to be exhaustive in 
terms of expropriation and fair compensation. However, examples of abuses in 
property use still exist in places where ownership is obliged by law to play a 
social role.  
 
3. SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATIONS 
The expression of “social” is not conspicuously used in the United 
States when authorities show their interest in limiting the use of the right to 
property. The opposite happens in constitutional legal systems during the post-
World War II period in which we can observe a moral mandate through the 
social function of property as suggested by Léon Duguit (Gismondi, 2008, pp. 
17-46). Nevertheless, it does not mean the understanding of ownership in the 
country remains an absolute individual prerogative against social perspectives. 
Born from the Housing Act of 1937, the 42 U.S. Code § 1437 on low-income 
housing assistance gives the state, which is represented by the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development, the power to make effective decent homes 
and urban renewal projects. The finality and the explanatory reasons for the 
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 Housing Act of 1937, or in Ferrajoli’s words, the pragmatic issues of the act, 
were conceived by the values of decency and acceptable standards for 
housing, which the American society has held by consensus since the 1930s. 
Another kind of general agreement of how proprietors should cooperate with 
society is present in the pragmatism of the impact fees. According to 
Juergensmeyer (2015), impact fees are nurtured by the theory that “new 
development, and not existing residents, should bear the cost of providing new 
infrastructure”. Impact fees serve as: 
Payments required by local governments of new development 
for the purpose of providing new or expanded public capital 
facilities required to serve that development. The fees typically 
require cash payments in advance of the completion of 
development, are based on a methodology and calculation 
derived from the cost of the facility and the nature and size of 
the development, and are used to finance improvements offsite 
of, but to the benefit of the development.1 
In the following section, we will see how the impact of environmental 
issues may lead to a more systemic view on property, its social dimensions 
and the role of public administrations.  
Homestead Exemption is defined as a legal regime to protect 
proprietors under some extreme circumstances dictated by socioeconomic 
contingency. It is used by individuals over 60, or the disabled, to give certain 
immunities in forced sale situations when one has to sell his or her home to 
pay off creditors. Property tax exemption is also seen as a progressive policy; 
the more the value of the property, the more the owner pays, taking into 
consideration a fixed monetary amount. For example, a property valued at 
$100,000 dollars will have the first $50,000 of the assessed value not taxed, 
resulting in this case in only half of the total value being taxed. Another 
property valued at $200,000 dollars will also be exempt of $50,000, but the 
owner will have taxes on the remaining $150,000. Exemption may be applied 
differently from state to state in United States. The Code of Civil Procedure 
for California describes all the prerequisites in Article 4, §704.710, to be 
eligible. The maximum value for elderly people over 65 years old is $175,000 
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1 American Planning Association. Impact fees (1997). In American Planning Association. 
Retrieved from https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/impactfees.htm. 
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 dollars according to §704.730(a)(3) of the Californian  Code of Civil 
Procedure or the letter “c” of the same provision, affirming the right to 
homestead exemption for those individuals earning up to $25,000 dollars per 
year. 2  For residents in Ohio, according to the Code Section 2329.66(A): 
“Every person who is domiciled in this state may hold property exempt from 
execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a judgment or order”.3 
Nevertheless, it is interesting how the legislature added a legal remedy to 
protect people owing money “for health care services rendered or health care 
supplies provided to the person or a dependent of the person, one parcel or 
item of real or personal property that the person or a dependent of the person 
uses as a residence.” It is this connection between property and social needs, 
translated by the American legal system as a remedy for individuals that Léon 
Duguit defended in his conferences in Argentina. Ownership has an intimate 
connection with low-income earners, social care, and retirement. All these 
areas were the core of the welfare state in the European continent after World 
War II, and in many constitutional systems in Latin America (Migliari, 2015). 
The Federal Homestead Exemption is present in Section 522(d)(1) of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, and gives homeowners the benefit of not having the total 
property equity taxed in their primary residences. So, the interpretative 
boundaries of the social function of property, even when the juridical category 
does not exist in a legal system, may not maintain a strict relation with 
political regimes in either capitalist or social democratic societies.  
In 2012, Act 13 was passed in Pennsylvania as an amendment to Title 
58 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes for oil and gas. It is also called 
an impact fee, understood as an unconventional gas well fee. The accumulated 
funds are directed to local and state governments. Act 13 details how the fee 
must be spent, and usually covers the local impacts of drilling, although a 
variety of other purposes may be served with the funds. Act 13, or the Impact 
Fee Act, specifically regulates the imposition of that unconventional sum by 
county or alternatively municipalities, making it more effective. A county is 
permitted to impose the fee if unconventional gas wells are located within its 
borders and the local public authorities pass an ordinance within 60 days of 
the effective date of Act 13. Under the Impact Fee Act, the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Commission (PUC) may collect and disburse the fee. Also, the 
PUC is responsible for any review related to ordinances at the request of 
a municipality, as well as complaints filed by a well proprietor/operator, or 
any person residing within the municipality who is somehow affected by the 
enactment or enforcement of a local ordinance.4 
Although the notion of the social function of property is not explicitly 
mentioned by any act in United States, we suggest the description of the 
                                                 
2 Retrieved from https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/   
3 Retrieved from http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2329  
4 Retrieved from http://www.puc.state.pa.us/  
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 impact fee as the most radical idea of environmental impact connected to 
either municipal or local powers. In Brazil, for example, there is a tax called 
financial compensation for the natural resources exploitation or “compensação 
financeira pela exploração de recursos minerais”. 5 It is much more like a 
compensation based on the notion of a commercial activity, rather than the 
idea of an environmental cost. According to the Pennsylvania’s 
Unconventional Gas Well Impact Fee Report, the funds collected with the 
Impact Fee Act were used to develop a sustainable and modern gas 
transportation sector in the state. 6  Moreover, the fee also proportioned 
partnerships and investments to ameliorate the transparency of the gas or oil 
extraction. 7  Any person can access a webpage in real time in which a 
complete cartography of all economic activities is available.8 Individuals may 
also observe the quantities connecting them with the funds collected. This 
webpage is a mechanism for transparency that forces private and public actors 
to reduce mistakes or even avoid corruption. In these two respects, the 
development of infrastructure to increase environmental protection, and 
transparent information, the concept of property is intimately linked to its 
social dimension.9 
Impact fees were initiated by local governments in the omission of 
explicit state-enabling legislation. Consequently, such sums were originally 
defended as an exercise of local government to preserve the health, safety and 
welfare of the community. It is important to say that the notion of impact fees 
is stronger than the concept of social function in the United States, despite the 
fact that the targets of both legal concepts are easily interchangeable. In 
Tennessee, municipalities embedded in the general law mayor-aldermanic 
charter, and the general law modified city manager-council charter, the 
authority to levy impact fees based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-2-
201(15) and § 6-33-101(a). The County Powers Relief Act of 2006 established 
some restrictions on the assessment of impact fees for counties. Moreover, the 
                                                 
5  Brazilian taxes for mineral extraction are applied to a company’s activity without any 
environmental compensation. See Confederação Nacional de Municípios. (2012). Entenda a 
CFEM (Compensação Financeira pela Exploração de Recursos Minerais), Estudos Técnicos 
(Report No. 5). Retrieved from http://www.cnm.org.br/cms/biblioteca/ET%20Vol%205%20-
%2014.%20Entenda%20a%20CFEM.pdf  
6 2013 Annual Act 13, Unconventional Gas Well Impact Fee Report to the Pennsylvania 
Legislature and the Governor’s Budget Office, Jan. 1- Dec. 31, 2013, Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection, available at 
http://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Energy/OilandGasPrograms/Act13/Documents/0120-RE-
DEP4436%20%20%202013%20NGV%20and%20ESF%20Annual%20Report.pdf   
7 Id. 
8 Retrieved from http://www.depgis.state.pa.us/PaOilAndGasMapping/  
9 Infrastructure investments had a positive balance during 2015. The exploitation of natural 
resources meant more facilities for society. The funds are used between the counties, and 
municipalities can be consulted with the information offered by the Public Utility 
Commission. Retrieved from https://www.act13-
reporting.puc.pa.gov/Modules/PublicReporting/Overview.aspx  
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 law also imposed some criteria for metropolitan governments as well after 
June 30, 2006. However, limitations were not extended to cities. 
Regarding jurisprudence and interpretative boundaries for property in 
connection with ownership, the courts gradually established guidelines for 
constitutional interpretation of valid impact fees relying on a “rational nexus” 
that must create intimate links between the regulatory fee or exaction and the 
activity that is being regulated. While Tennessee courts have scrutinised the 
extent of the meaning “public services,” the Tennessee Supreme Court has 
addressed the interpretation of “public purpose” on several occasions, because 
municipal expenditures of the public budget is tied to public ends. The case 
Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency v. Leech, 591 S.W.2d 427 
(Tenn. 1979) corroborated the idea of using tax increment financing for urban 
renewal programmes in zones in need of a minimum infrastructure (Briffault, 
2010). In McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 
(1958), when the privilege taxes were analysed with an analogous case, Smith 
v. City of Pigeon Forge, the court stated: “Taxation is a mode of raising 
revenue for public purposes only." Taylor McBean & Co. v. Chandler, 56 
Tenn. 349. This is true even when there is no express restriction in the 
Constitution and such a constitutional provision is simply declaratory of the 
common law. 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 13, 14, p. 64; 51 Am. Jur. 372, sec. 321 et 
seq. 203 Tenn. at 509, 314 S.W.2d at 17”. 10  
The rationale of taxes and fees tends to be limited by social 
investments in the sense that the community reaps the benefits of public funds. 
Nonetheless, impact fees are devoted to the marginal or additional costs of 
serving a new development and must not be confused with development taxes. 
The latter is intended for either construction or adequate facilities taxes and is 
considered a privilege tax on the development industry that intends to raise 
revenue for general government purposes, while the former “levies are for 
streets and roads, parks, or fire protection services. The actual rate of the fee is 
set by the local governing body, often at a level that is less than the maximum 
that could be supported” (Green & Young, 2002, p. 2).11 When we study the 
case Imboden v. City of Bristol, 132 Tenn. 562, 179 S.W. 147 (1915), the 
understanding of “‘public purpose’ is limited by anything that promotes the 
public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and 
                                                 
10 Retrieved from https://law.justia.com/cases/tennessee/supreme-court/1980/600-s-w-2d-231-
2.html  
11 When we analyse the difference between impact fees and development taxes in the United 
States, it is noticeable that the latter may favour housing affordability more than the former. 
They are easier to deal with by local public administrations: “Development/adequate facilities 
taxes are simpler to enact, administer, and update, and are not usually subject to legal 
challenge. Development taxes promote housing affordability by taxing all development, 
whereas some impact fees are assessed only on residential development”. Retrieved from 
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/tacir/documents/PayingForGrowth.pdf  
85
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 2 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol2/iss1/6
 contentment of the residents of a municipal corporation”.12 As regards content 
of the same ratio decidendi, the case of Knoxville Housing Authority v. City of 
Knoxville, 174 Tenn. 76, 83, 123 S.W.2d 1085, 1087 (1939) refers to the 
public administration’s responsibility in combating poor shelters in the form 
of slums during the first half of the 20th century in the United States. 
Affordable and decent places to live, for example, were understood also as 
part of the property wealth.  
 
The courts there took notice that ‘slum districts with their 
filthy, congested, weather-exposed living quarters are breeding 
places of disease, immorality and crime’ and that ‘the existence 
of such districts depresses the taxable value of neighboring 
property’ depriving local and state governments of revenue 
while at the same time being a source of ‘great expense in 
combating disease, crime and conflagration originating in such 
localities.’ 
(Maltbie, 1944, p. 125). However, impact fees should not be used to pay for 
the sins of the past, as it is said in colloquial contexts. In California, the 
California Government Code, 66001(g), affirms: “A fee shall not include the 
costs attributable to existing deficiencies in public facilities.” As the Sec. 29-
20- 104.5(2), Colorado Revised Statutes says: “No impact fee or other similar 
development charge shall be imposed to remedy any deficiency in capital 
facilities that exists without regard to the proposed development” (Been, 
2005).  
 
4. ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS AND PROPERTY SOCIAL DIMENSIONS  
Federal Laws and United States  
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Colorado decided the case Krupp v. 
Breckenridge Sanitation District. The dispute started when the company 
questioned the plant investment fee applied to one of the company's new 
developments. The argument was that costs used for the improvement of the 
sewer systems could be offset against the investment fee. Furthermore, the 
developer argued the amounts levied on the project should be proportional in 
an individualised fashion, and not on non-residential investments. The court 
reaffirmed the application of the impact fee as lawful and not subject to an 
analysis as in the cases Nollan v. Californian Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 
825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). In all cases, it is 
clear the denial for an automatic just compensation was derived from the 
limits imposed by the public powers on property development under the 
                                                 
12  Retrieved from  
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2017/op17-043.pdf  
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 rationale of takings foreseen in the Fifth Amendment.13 Minimum standards 
set by public authorities based on law required for all developers were not 
interchangeable with the fees paid. In other words, the fact an urban project 
was obliged to provide for a certain level of sanitary service included in the 
budget of the investments did not mean the sum should be applied exactly on 
the plot built, but also elsewhere (Crossmit, 2010).  
It is important to notice how topics we usually name in the Latin 
American and European experience as "the right to the city" and "social 
function" appear in the U.S. urban reality as much more of an issue translated 
into community’s rights or concerning taxpayer citizens. A notion that 
functions as a sort of umbrella to translate the human demands in urban 
context and planning, but defined as the right to the city by a consolidated 
literature. A different approach would be redefining social dimensions and 
social function, discerning the idea of social indicating the praxis of limiting 
the property system. Urban studies specially linked to participative citizenry 
and decision-making processes include the philosophical seminal reflection of 
Henri Lefebvre (Lefebvre, 2009) and other areas of knowledge such as the 
geographic urban inquiries of Harvey (2013), De Souza (2010), Purcell 
(2002), Mitchell (1995); other intellectuals from public administrative and 
urban law analyses as Ponce (2013), Fernandes (2007), Zamora (2002), 
Jacquot & Priet (2004), Parejo Alonso & García Enterría (1981); human rights 
such as Kenna (2006); and other studies involving urban development and 
forms of State violence or segregation such as Alkhalili, Dajani & De Leo 
(2014), Friendly (2013) and Marcuse (2009).  
Two Supreme Court cases, Nollan v. Californian Coastal Commission 
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, appeared in the dispute, Koontz v. St. Johns River 
Water Management District. When Mr. Koontz intended to develop 3.7 acres 
from the owned area of 14.9 acres, St. Johns River Water Management 
District imposed a fee that the proprietor refused to pay, because the zone 
where the money was to be spent was miles away. The proprietors agreed that 
the compensation did not have any connection to the location of the project. 
As an instrument of impact mitigation, a conditional permit was issued by the 
District requiring a reduction in the size of the development to one acre, 
                                                 
13 Nollan v. Californian Coastal Commission started with an administrative requirement of the 
Californian Coastal Commission (CCC), conditioning a permit for the developer to build on 
his property if the owner accepted an easement guaranteeing passage for people in order to 
reach the coastal line. The dispute reached the Supreme Court of United States once the owner 
did not accept the imposition by the CCC since the access condition disrespected the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as assimilated against the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, because the proportion of the 
easement was almost imperceptible and the passage did not impair the value of the property. 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court of United States came to the conclusion that 
the: “City held not to have shown rough proportionality required, under Fifth Amendment's 
takings clause, to condition building permit's approval on dedication of portions of lot to city 
for greenway and pedestrian/bicycle pathway”.  
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 specific drainage, and construction of one more easement on the remaining 
acreage (Hagerman, 2015; Keogh, 2013). The developer understood the 
District’s indicated mitigation as “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s 
police power constituting a taking without just compensation.” 14 The case 
arrived at the Supreme Court of Florida, because: 
. . . [the] District did not approve his application on the 
condition that he surrender (sic) an interest in his land. Instead, 
the District, after suggesting that he could obtain approval by 
signing over such an interest, denied his application because he 
refused to yield. The Florida Supreme Court blessed this 
maneuver and thus effectively interred those important 
decisions. Because we conclude that Nollan and Dolan cannot 
be evaded in this way, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
must be reversed.15 
Two procedural issues were formulated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District. The first addresses the growth of the discretionary power. A type of 
coercion: 
“[...] that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits 
because the government often has broad discretion to deny a 
permit that is worth far more than property it would like to 
take. By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding 
over a public right-of way, for example, the government can 
pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property for which 
the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just 
compensation”.16  
The second procedural issue relies on the evidence that private 
enterprises generate costs for the public interest, but owners can offset 






                                                 
14 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–2593 (2013). 
Retrieved from https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1447_4e46.pdf  
15 Idem 
16 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–2593 (2013). 
Retrieved from https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1447_4e46.pdf, p. 7. 
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 “Where a building proposal would substantially increase traffic 
congestion, for example, officials might condition permit 
approval on the owner’s agreement to deed over the land 
needed to widen a public road [...] Insisting that landowners 
internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a 
hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long 
sustained such regulations against constitutional attack. See 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 
(1926)”.17 
 Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment is reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings more consistent with the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of United States (Fenster, 2014). In the case Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District, the content of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision calls attention to the analogous aspects and responsibilities to 
what Léon Duguit calls the social function.  
When we study city conflicts we find in the case of Olympia v. 
Drebick, a broader debate on urban complexity. “Cities and towns across the 
nation impose many kinds of permitting fees every day. Some enable a 
government to mitigate a new development’s impact on the community, like 
increased traffic or pollution—or destruction of wetlands. See, e.g., Olympia 
v. Drebick, 156 Wash. 2d 289, 305, 126 P. 3d 802, 809 (2006)”. 18 
Segregation is also one of the negative consequences of the development of 
urban zones since the creation of spaces oriented by a capitalist and a 
consumerist view may impose their material wish fulfilment. Public policies 
are a powerful instrument to reestablish new political and urban possibilities 
for a citizenry consensus oriented by the general interest (Ponce, 2013). 
Sometimes the legal category of social function reveals more abstract 
or even intangible conflicts regarding the limits of property, but also connects 
to some restrictions for absolute anti-democratic notions on fundamental 
rights. A New York case sparked a controversy when in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City, the historical value of a building was 
defended by the city administrative power by not giving a construction permit 
to the owners. The company presented a project of fifty apartments to be 
erected on the original structure and, following the city's restriction on its 
plans for the building, went to court alleging the taking of its property without 
fair compensation:  
“After the Commission had rejected appellants’ plans for the 
building as destructive of the Terminal’s historic and aesthetic 
features, with no judicial review thereafter being sought, 
appellants brought suit in state court claiming that the 
                                                 
17 Ibidem, p. 8. 
18 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–2593 (2013). 
Retrieved from https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1447_4e46.pdf 
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 application of the Landmarks Law had ‘taken’ their property 
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and arbitrarily deprived them of their 
property without due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court’s grant of relief was 
reversed on appeal." 
Regarding a possible act of expropriation:  
“. . . the New York Court of Appeals ultimately conclude[ed] 
that there was no ‘taking,’ since the Landmarks Law had not 
transferred control of the property to the city, but only 
restricted appellants’ exploitation of it; and that there was no 
denial of due process because (1) the same use of the Terminal 
was permitted as before; (2) the appellants had not shown that 
they could not earn a reasonable return on their investment. . . ” 
In 1978, the dispute ended with the United States Supreme Court 
reaffirming the historical value of the building, and the act of the city was 
found legally binding due to New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law. 19 
 
5. EU LAW AND THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM  
Since 1966, the Alteo Society, an aluminium manufacturer in 
Gardeanne, France, has been dumping toxic waste such as arsenic, uranium-
238, thorium-232, and mercury, among other heavy metals, in the 
Mediterranean Sea. The plant is located seven kilometres from the coast of 
Casis, Marseille Metropolitan Area, but coexisting with the National Park of 
Calanques, Bouches-du-Rhône, Department of the Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur region. 20  The dumping has gained the attention of citizens and 
academics since the discovery that the toxic waste is directly disposed into the 
sea without any proper treatment or other mitigating measure. Altea is 
obligated to comply with the standards of information required by the 
European Union (EU) in risky environmental activities.21 According to the 
Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
Member States are authorised to grant exemptions from measures to prevent 
or restrict the input of pollutants into groundwater, but any “exemptions 
should be based on transparent criteria and be detailed in the river basin 
management plans.” Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the document detail, respectively, 
the assessment of groundwater chemical status, the adequate procedures, and 
                                                 
19 Retrieved from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/104/case.html 
20  Landrevie, B. (2015, May). La Mediterranée empoisonnée. Le Monde Diplomatique. 
Retrieved from https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/05/LANDREVIE/52952  
21 See the debate about Alteo and pollutants in the article Valo, M. (2017, January 10). Boues 
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 what to do in case of a finding of any sort of residue putting animal or human 
lives at risk. Provision 5.2 says:  
“Member States shall, in accordance with Part B of Annex IV, 
reverse trends which present a significant risk of harm to the 
quality of aquatic ecosystems or terrestrial ecosystems, to 
human health, or to actual or potential legitimate uses of the 
water environment, through the programme of measures 
referred to in Article 11 of Directive 2000/60/EC, in order 
progressively to reduce pollution and prevent deterioration of 
groundwater."22 
Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
creates responsibilities for the Member States to prevent and control 
groundwater pollution, as Article 1 affirms. The European Union law is 
designed under the umbrella of harmonised norms (directives) that establish 
goals and a time limit to adapt national legislation, whilst giving freedom of 
means to national authorities. 23  Although the normative framework has a 
neoliberal, consensual, and political tradition in the history of the EU 
(Bugaric, 2013), Article 2.1 affirms: “groundwater quality standard’ means an 
environmental quality standard expressed as the concentration of a particular 
pollutant, group of pollutants or indicator of pollution in groundwater, which 
should not be exceeded in order to protect human health and the 
environment.” There are two relevant aspects to that provision. The first one 
deals with the technical definition of groundwater quality standard based on a 
specific quantity of a particular pollutant or a group of chemicals dangerous 
for the environment or human health. The other aspect confronts the 
possibility of control to promote the groundwater quality standard since 
Article 2.3: “[the] ‘threshold value’ means a groundwater quality standard set 
by Member States in accordance with Article 3,” meaning one Member State 
may have a different notion of what is a pollutant or not. In that sense, 
harmonising the law of the EU becomes an object of political arrangements 
inside the country and a topic of interested exchanges in the Council of 
Ministers. Conflicting dualities, such as an either-or situation involving 
national-supranational competences dedicated to a problem, have been part of 
political dissent in the Council (Hayes-Renshaw, 2017, p. 80). Article 6 of the 
Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
indicates the measures that Member States shall take to avoid the negligent 
contact of hazardous substances with humans and environment. 
                                                 
22 Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0118&from=EN  
23 According to the Article 1, Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council: “This Directive establishes specific measures as provided for in Article 17(1) and (2) 
of Directive 2000/60/EC in order to prevent and control groundwater pollution”. 
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 What happens to France if the country does not respect the European 
Communitarian Law? Observing Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, 
we find: 
“. . . the European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal 
by one third of the Member States or by the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may 
determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a 
Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after 
inviting the Member State in question to submit its 
observations.” 
Whether a technical issue or not, politics will define an existent and 
continuous breach of the law. For example, if France were deemed to be 
exhibiting negligent behaviour, and if said negligent behaviour was 
unanimously understood as menacing for the EU purposes, with at least one 
third of the Member States’ or Commission’s support, then France, in that 
case, would be invited to explain what was occurring in Gardanne, affecting 
the National Park of Calanques, Bouches-du-Rhône, Department of the 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur region. As predicted in the Article 8.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union, it does not seem plausible that:  
“For the purposes of paragraph 1 [values of the Union on peace 
and cooperation], the Union may conclude specific agreements 
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of 
undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the 
subject of periodic consultation.” 
The Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishes strong guidelines for the EU Community providing a strict 
water policy for the Member States. Articles 1 and 2.2 reiterate how states 
shall comply in avoiding groundwater pollutants. The Article 4 sets the 
environmental objectives to be achieved as also the responsibility States must 
committed to regarding a non-deterioration of the environmental conditions of 
the water seen in the letter b(1) of the same provision:  
“Member States shall implement the measures necessary to 
prevent or limit the input of pollutants into groundwater and to 
prevent the deterioration of the status of all bodies of 
groundwater, subject to the application of paragraphs 6 and 7 
and without prejudice to paragraph 8 of this Article and subject 
to the application of Article 11(3)(j).” 
With reference to the limits of fundamental principles in economic or 
tax disputes inside the EU market, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has rejected the argument or legal rationale of unlimited power of the 
states disguised by their historical absolute formulas of sovereignty. As two 
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 examples, we mention the Case 26/62 van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration in which the CJEU affirmed in paragraph 11, letter 
B: 
“On the substance of the Case [...] The conclusion to be drawn 
from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit with limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also 
their nationals.” 
Additionally, the Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, the tribunal says in its 
section “On the submission that the court was obliged to apply the national 
law,” paragraph 9, that:  
“By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its 
own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and 
capacity of representation on the international plane and, more 
particularly, real powers stemming from the States to the 
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body 
of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.” 
(Emmert, 2000, pp. 14-23).  
 
6. THE INTERPRETATIVE BOUNDARIES OF SOCIAL DIMENSIONS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
What are the environmental issues behind American impact fees or 
development taxes? Which social dimensions can be found in the European 
directives made for groundwater protection? In Luigi Ferrajoli’s constitutional 
theory, we may find that the real finality and explanation of both legal systems 
completely disorient our common sense. While the United States impact fees 
and development taxes presuppose an undeniable collision between the 
interests of the community and entrepreneurs because private sectors are 
expected to pay or compensate individuals beforehand, the European 
directives reinforce the notion of control only after a Member State does not 
comply with the law. One assumes that economic power transforming or 
exploiting nature generates negative consequences, the other sees dissenting 
externalities in the field of political confidence in the Council of Ministers, the 
European Commission, or even the Parliament. Yet the EU does not have any 
power in the field of land use. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU), for instance, brings some remedies for the 
violation of everyone’s rights and the environmental protection, respectively, 
Articles 47 and 37. Further, the CFREU refers to improvement of the 
environmental quality accompanied by public policies and in accordance with 
the principle of sustainable development.  
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 From our perspective, the explanation of how environmental impact is 
seen may link to the social dimensions and limits previously discussed in this 
work. The meanings, references and presuppositions of the European politics 
or its semantics based on historical facets of sovereignty cannot guarantee the 
social function of property, or its limits in the financial realm. 24  Other 
elements behind the curtain of Ferrajoli’s constitutional theory give room to 
empirical and informative content embodied in the theory of law that is 
translated in the EU as harmonised legal grounds, which is mainly politics not 
law. Remedies for any risky or dangerous situation related to environmental 
questions are not an objective of the CJEU. In critical moments, some 
European nations will be more influential than the others in intergovernmental 
rooms, for example, the one where Council of Ministers meets. However, 
supranational powers may counterbalance the interest of powerful states with 
sensitive topics such as water, natural resources and environmental protection 
if the chemical muddle, polluted air or any other risky activity exploiting a 
property can cross over the border for political, not legal, reasons. Moreover, 
transnational issues and open markets subject to a ferocious global order 
operating since 1970 may interfere in legal matters (Kjaer, 2013; Eckersley, 
2004; Huntington, 1973; Nye & Keohane, 1971).  
There are two main reasons for that complex mistrust among nation-
states in that common legal system, procedural law and independence of the 
EU institutions. The first is connected to the pragmatic use of the directives 
inside the organisation since the dumping of pollutants into the Mediterranean 
Sea by Alteo Society was interpreted as an internal issue out of the 
competence of the EU. It is a political mechanism, in which member States 
negotiate for or against, that ultimately leads to a report, recommendations or 
even sanctions against the offending State. The timing depends on the internal 
dynamics of the parties in France and the relations the country will set with 
other Member States. Second, the principles of non-intervention and self-
determination, corroborated by the long history of the Treaty of Westphalia in 
the continent, reinforces the political approach over the legal one. However, 
the CJEU has already said that “Environmental protection is most commonly 
included in the judicial deliberations concerning the Charter [of Fundamental 
Rights] as a possible justification for breach of EU’s fundamental rights, and 
primarily the right to property, and the principle of equality and non-
discrimination.” The general rule concerning the right to property, as 
                                                 
24 Up to a certain extent, the case of Brexit is a sort of mistrust between the economic and 
political elites in EU even when the numbers of the process will cost half million jobs, for 
example, while the British finances struggle inside the regional organisation. The question 
seems to be how the United Kingdom will guarantee the marginal returns for the financial 
institutions regardless of the number of people are unemployed and which roles the property 
system will play after all. See Walker, P. (2018, January 11). UK could lose half a million 
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 established by the Court, is that “it must be viewed in relation to its social 
function” and not as a human right (Bogojević, 2017; Estapà, 2013). The case 
C-530/11, European Commission v. United Kingdom, is an eloquent example 
of how the CJEU understands the right to ownership as a limited right. As to 
the United Kingdom’s argument that the limiting of cross-undertakings could 
result in infringement of the right to property, the Court consistently 
acknowledges that the right to property is not an absolute right, but must be 
viewed in relation to its social function. Its exercise may therefore be 
restricted, provided that those restrictions, in fact, correspond to objectives of 
general interest and do not constitute, in relation to the aim pursued, 
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of 
the right guaranteed (see, to this effect, Križan and Others, paragraph 113 and 
the case-law cited). Protection of the environment is one of those objectives 
and is therefore capable of justifying a restriction on the exercise of the right 
to property (see, also, to this effect, Križan and Others, paragraph 114 and the 
case-law cited).25 Public participation and access to justice are the immediate 
remedies for the control of uses and abuses in property usufruct against the 
general interest in many thematic fields (Ponce, 2008, pp. 9-13; Krasner, 
1972). Therefore, the internal limits of the property, i.e., the exercise of right 
putting the environment and human relations at risk, is one of the cornerstones 
to differentiate it from the external limits (Crawford, 2011). 
 
CONCLUSION 
When we analyze the social dimensions of the impact fees and the 
development taxes in the U.S. legal system, it is noticeable how the American 
legal thought assumes the notion of impact produced by ownership. It is a 
modern and pragmatic overview perfectly comparable with Léon Duguit’s 
ideas of social function of property to limit the expanding subjectivity or 
individuality of proprietors. Nevertheless, in the land of the French 
philosopher’s ideas, we find the case of Alteo Society, on the coast of Casis, 
Marseille Metropolitan Area. It produces aluminium at an industrial plant in 
Gardanne and has since 1966 been dumping toxic waste such as arsenic, 
uranium-238, thorium-232, and mercury, among other heavy metals, into the 
Mediterranean Sea. It is a flagrant abuse involving proprietors and public 
administrations that will be demonstrated with the first small submarine 
explorer collecting samples for laboratory tests and chemical analyses. 
Although inside the EU, and obliged to perpetrate the principles and values of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, France is only 
controlled and subject to binding decisions if the political institutions of the 
organisation say so. From a domestic perspective, national remedies are 
predicted in the Articles L. 216-6 and Art. L. 432-2 of the Code of 
Environment, Code de l’environnement. It is also important to mention the 
                                                 
25 Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
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 Article 1 of the Forest Code, Code forestier, which takes into consideration 
the economic, environmental and social functions in plural as a way to suggest 
separate, but interdependent variables.  
The notion of property as an inconstant concept is indispensable to 
understand the debate (MacPherson, 1978). In the United States, the social 
dimensions of ownership are expressed by a pragmatic view (pragmatics) on 
the use of law to mitigate the urban impacts and environmental 
transformation. However, the North-American pragmatism ex ante is 
beneficial for certain powers, classes, and interests since the rapid exploitation 
of the soil leads to the exhaustion of the natural resources based on a model of 
life unamicable for the totality of the society. In other words, the symbols of 
property development, even when they are alleviated by fees and taxes, cannot 
be led by an exponential feeling of realisation. In the EU, on the contrary, the 
social function is rooted in ex post meanings (semantics), which is either 
logical, with reference to matters, presuppositions, and implications of what 
already exists, or lexical, regarding whether the analysis of any legal issue is 
appropriate or not after ownership is consummated as an object of a dispute.  
Furthermore, a final observation has to do with the totality of social 
function as non-subjective matter. As Léon Duguit proposed in his lectures, 
individuality cannot be realised by an absolute comprehension of what 
property should be. So, for him, the human egotism expressed by property is 
an oxymoron, because it is the faith one may have in the spiritual exercise of 
freedom. The belief in property and capital, even for those who do not have a 
place to live, is the financial dimension that aggressively dominates the system 
of property as a transnational topic (Rolnik, 2016; Aalbers, 2008; Marcuse, 
1979). For Duguit, the wealth in form of land or industry has a social function, 
which is to say, ownership must be at our service as society. The rights of the 
proprietors shall be guaranteed if the owner is committed to productive 
enterprises and creates benefits for the general interest. The French thinker of 
law was very much convinced property had to be inserted in what Ferrajoli 
named syntax of law, or the totality of legal and real human experiences. That 
sort of pact presupposes that all individuals are interested in working for their 
own interest, respecting the constitutional, socioeconomic, and political order. 
We still see some challenges related to property system in the most developed 
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